The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes, but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are static.
I. Introduction
Many economists, political scientists, newspaper coiurnnists. and politicians argue that the United States should imitate its major trading partners and adopt industrial policies to help domestic firms gain a strategic advantage in international trade (increase their "competitiveness").' Trade theorists use static or two-period models of imperfect competition to show that taxes or subsidies on output or exports ("output policies") or taxes or subsidies on investment or adjustment ("investment" or "industrial policies") enable a domestic firm to behave as if it were a Stackelberg leader.' The static nature of these modeis obscures an important difference between output and investment policies. For example. in Brander and Spencer's (1 983 ) twoperiod model, it appears that output and investment (R&D) policies have similar strategic value. We show that, in a muitiperiod model, investment policies may be ineffective in shifting rents from foreign rivais to domestic firms whereas output policies remain effective. ' For example, Borrus. Tyson. and Zysman (1986) argue that the Japanese semiconductor industry became a major competitor on world markets "largely at the expense of the U.S. industry," as "a planned result of a concerted policy effort," Johnson (1984) contends that the Reagan administration, which estabiished a Commission on lndustrial Competitiveness, tried to use the Department of Defense to implement industriai poiicies. See. however. Krugman (1984) for systematic empiricai evidence on the practicality of such policies. See Spencer and Brander (1 983) . Dixlt (1 984). Brander and Spencer (1985) . Eaton and Grossman (1986) . Gruenspecht (1988) . Markusen and Venables (1988) , Cheng (1 988), de Meza (1 989), Neary (1 991) and Krishna and Thursby (1 991) for conditions under which these results hoid.
Although output poiicies can be used strategicaiiy in a dynamic worid, their practical importance is limited by their poiiticai cost. Export subsidies, with few exceptions such as agricultural products, contravene the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Moreover, export subsidies are counterproductive if trading partners retaliate, Not only do such output and export policies foster international discord, but the transfers they require carry high domestic political costs. These considerations lead many politicians to prefer industrial policies.3 Such programs, which do not explicitly violate GATT agreements, are aimed at altering the industrial infrastructure, which includes the capital stock, the quality of labor, and institutions that affect the labor market.
In our model, the government sets policies in each period, and then firms make their decisions about investment and output for that period. The government i s able to commit for a period. Within each period, the government has a first-mover advantage, but it is unable to make commitments about how it will behave in the future.
The government's limited abiiity to make commitments i s what distinguishes our model from existing static models.4
Many countries provide trade adjustment assistance (e, g., the 1974 U. S. Trade Adjustment Act), tax credits for investments, aid to specific industries such as the textile and shipbuilding industries, and various manpower training programs (Frank 1977) . Most major developed exporting countries, except the United States, require that firms notify their workers in advance of plant closures (Frank 1977) , raising adjustment costs to firms, Magaziner and Reich (1982) also describe other industrial poiicies including interest subsidies, accelerated depreciation on investments abroad, tax deferral on investments, and marketing assistance (Information and promotion and incentives for small businesses).
The earlier static models cannot be used to examine the issue of credible commitments by governments, as Eaton and Grossman (1988, p, 607) point out. Cheng (1987) uses a dynamic version of the Brander and Spencer (1985) model but considers only open-loop policies, and thus ignores the commitment probiem, 3 Previous papers. including Staiger and Tabellini (1987) . Matsuyama (1990) , Brainard (1990) and Torneli (1991) . have used dynamic models to demonstrate that the first best trade policy is likely to be dynamically inconsistent. Thi s implies that the inability to commit reduces the efficacy of trade policy. Our results extend this conclusion in two ways. First, we show that the inability to commit has a quaiitatively different effect for output and investment policies. A limited ability to commit I s Irrelevant for output policies, but is extremely important for investment policies.
Second, we show that In the limiting case, where the period of commitment approaches zero, Investment policies become completely ineffective (whereas the efficacy of output policies i s not altered). Thi s limiting result provides a lower bound to the value of intervention even when the government's ability to commit i s finite though small.
We are not interested in showing. in yet another context, that the set of equilibria of dynamic (or repeated) games can differ from that of static games.
instead. we want to show that the intrinsic properties of output and investment policies are quite different, and that this difference has been overlooked. Toward this end, we take the "standard static model and make it dynamic, In particuiar, we adopt the same assumptions about timing of agents' moves and the same equilibrium concept as is used commonly in the standard models.
Previous modeis of strategic trade use subgame perfect equilibria, which, for finite horizons, are obtained by working backwards from the last period. Agents' decisions are conditioned on payoff-reievant information: the "state," Agents understand how their current behavior wiii affect agents in the future. We adopt the same equiiibrium concept by using a Markov Perfect Equiiibrium (MPE). Given the Markov assumption, punishment strategies, which can support a wide variety of outcomes, are eliminated. The Markov assumption enables us to compare our results with those obtained from previous static models.
The conclusions about output policies based on static models do not change for a dynamic model because the current output decisions do not depend on future policies. The efficacy of industrial poiicies i s dramatically different, however, in a dynamic model than in a static model, because the investment decision depends on future as well as current government policies. Even if the government chooses its industrial policy in the current period before firms choose their investments. the government's next period actions follow those investment decisions, If there are several periods, one agent moves before another in only a limited sense. The static model i s a true "first-mover game;" whereas, in the dynamic model, agents alternate moves.5
In the next section, we describe the model and explain why output policies are effective in a dynamic setting where the government has a limited ability to commit.
In the third section, we expiain why industrial poiicies may become ineffective.
Numerical examples are presented in the following section. We summarize and draw conclusions in the iast section. Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Eaton and Engers (1990) characterize MPE in games with aiternating moves. 5
The Model
To illustrate why the two types of policies differ in multiperiod markets. we use a model in which the dynamics stem from adjustment costs.6 we assume that there are only two firmsa home firm, h, and a foreign firm, fthat export all their output to a world market. Each firm plays Nash, taking its rival's exports in the current period. t, as given, and chooses its current rate of output, qC and its current rate of investment, I ; , i = h, f, The government of the home firm intervenes before the firms act.
The foreign government i s passive and does not retaliate. In static models these assumptions imply a role for government intervention. Each firm's objective i s to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of (subsidy inclusive) profits net of adjustment costs; the home government's objective is to maximize the home firm's profits, net of subsidies and adjustment costs.
Each period lasts for e units of time. For simplicity, we assume that the interval at which decisions are made equals the length of a period of commitment. At the beginning of each period (before firms make their current decisions), the home government chooses an export subsidy. s. and an industrial poiicy, v. Outside the steady state, policies change over time, but we omit time subscripts where the meaning i s clear.
There i s a growing theoretical literature on imperfect competition in the presence of adjustment costs, such as Fershtman and Kamien (1987) , Reynolds (1987) , Driskell and McCafferty (1989~) . Further, many authors show that adjustment costs are empiricaily important, such as Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) . Epstein and Denny (1983) . Epstein and Yatchew (1985) . and Perloff (1989, 1993) . Adjustment costs may be either internal to the firm (as is the case when there are bottlenecks. so that rapid adjustment increases overage costs of adjustment) or external (as i s the case when increased investment increases the costs of investment inputs, or increased disinvestment decreases the second price of second hand machinery).
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The level of (human or physical) capital in Firm i at time t i s k: , which i s given by The vector of capital stocks i s k = (k, k, ) .
Later we will specialize the model to examine the case where the government can only use investment policies. We start, however, by describing the model in which the government i s able to choose both an output subsidy and an investment subsidy at the beginning of each period. Thi s more complex model. which i s used to explain why output policies remain effective regardless of the period of commitment (E), is essential to establish the comparison between output and investment policies.
Because it i s easy to show that the efficacy of output policies does not depend on E.
we merely outline the argument here,7
In a Markov equilibrium, for any decision rules that determine the choices of v and I , the equilibrium choices of qi and s are determined in each period by solving a static game, In this static game firms take s as given and choose output to maximize current period profits. A deviation from the equilibrium output level by either firm would not affect the future stock of capital (the state variable). The deviation would consequently not aiter future decisions by firms or the government and. hence, would not aiter future profits. The government chooses the current output subsidy to maximize the domestic firm's current profits net of the subsidy. in each period the government chooses the subsidy that induces the domestic firms to choose the level of output that would result if that firm were a Stackeiberg leader.
A formal analysis i s contained in an eariier working paper, avaiiable from the authors upon request.
By solving the static game in each period, we can replace q = (q, , , qS and s by the equilibrium functions q*(k) and s*(k). If this repeated static game i s stationary (only the level of k changes over time) the functions q*(k) and s'(k) are also stationary. Thus, the firms' profit functions can be written in reduced-form as ni(k).' We can think of the policy v as simply a parameter that alters the home firm's adjustment costs. We define v so that a positive value represents a subsidy; that i s. ac/al i s decreasing in v. The function c(lp vi) is strictly convex in li so that firms take more than one period to adjust to a long-run equilibrium. if adjustment were instantaneous, there would be no technological source of dynamics.
If, instead, we write equation (1) as a backward difference equation, so that investment during the current period contributes to the capital stock avaiiabie in the current period, the game does not have this recursive structure, and the notction i s slightly more cumbersome, but the qualitative conclusions remain the same,
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The government's objective at time t is to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of social welfare until the horizon, z:
where p is the discount factor. The objective of Firm i (i = h, f) i s to maximize the present discounted vaiue of the stream of profits over the same horizon:
Ill. The Ineffectiveness of Industrial Policies
We now show that, in a MPE to the discrete stage dynamic game, the government's ability to influence the foreign firm by using industrial policies i s proportional to E, which is the length of each stage of the game and the period of commitment.
That is, the government's first-mover advantage falls as E shrinks. In the limiting case.
as E approaches 0, the game becomes a continuous time (differential) game. There i s a MPE to the continuous time game in which the government cannot intervene effectively. Next, by placing more structure on the game, we find conditions under which nonintervention is the iimit of the sequence of Markov equilibria obtained by shrinking E.
In order to concentrate on investment, we now assume that the government cannot use output policies, so that s(k) r 0 and government weifare in a period (exciusive of investment costs) equals the domestic firm's profits: W(k) = nh(k). Given this assumption, it i s unnecessary to specify the type of game the firms piay within a period (price or quantity setting). Recall that n,(k) is the reduced form profit function for firm i within a period. The ievei of k affects a firm's capacity and/or its marginal cost. The level therefore affects the firm's equilibrium choice of some other variable (e.g, price or quantity) and thus determines its profits. We conciude this section by returning to the more general case where the home government can use both output and industrial policies.
Under the assumption that a Markov equilibrium exists for all E. we can write the dynamic programming equations for the agents as:
If
The term in square brackets on the right side of each equation i s the payoff (profits minus adjustment costs) in the current period (a flow times E): the second term is the discounted stream of payoffs beginning at the next period. The function Ji(.). i = g, h.
f, gives the value of the game to agent i. Although each of these functions depends on E, for notational simplicity, we suppress that dependence. In (4) we assume that the equilibrium i s stationary.
Firm i chooses li and takes v and I , (i # i) in the current period as given. Each firm knows how future values of v will be chosen, so is given by some function v(kt+'), which i s endogenous to the game. Firms have rationai point expectations, so they are able to predict future values of the government policy.
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Firms maximize their payoffs subject to (1). The first-order conditions, which are assumed to be sufficient for a ma~imum,~ to the firms' problems are for i = h or f, vf = 0, vh = v, and where we define J,(kt+4 v(kt+')) = J;(kt+' ) (so that the second partial derivative includes both the direct effect of ki on J, and the indirect effect, via v). Equation (5) states that the marginal adjustment cost equals the shadow value of capitai for each firm in equilibrium. If the system of first-order conditions is invertible. the firms' decision rules can be written as By totaily differentiating the first-order conditions (5) and applying Cramer's rule, we obtain where H.
The analysis of this section relies principally on the first-order conditions of the agents' problems, Numerical experiments show that sometimes the necessary conditions are not sufficient even in the weli-behaved linear-quadratic structure (defined below). Thus, it i s unlikely that there are any simple conditions on the exogenous functions n and c that insure that the first-order conditions are also sufficient.
is the Jacobian of the first-order conditions and I H I i s the determinant. By differentiating the foreign firm's first-order condition holding v constant, we obtain the slope of its best-response function:
The government soives the problem in (4a) subject to (1) and (6). The government's first-order condition i s The partial derivatives of i with respect to v are given by (7a) and (7b). Where there i s no ambiguity, we write al/av rather than al*/av. Given the requirement of perfection and the assumption of stationarity, for ail possible vaiues of kt, the government's optimal choice of vt i s v(kt). At the beginning of the period, the government i s free to choose any vaiue of vt; however, due to its inability to commit to future vaiues, the choice it wants to make at t i s the same as the expectation of firms in the previous period.
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A. Welfare As a means of demonstrating that our dynamic modei i s a natural extension of familiar static models, we outiine conditions under which the welfare properties of the two types of modeis are the same. (These conditions hold for the exampies we describe in Section IV, but our basic point can be made more simpiy using only the first-order conditions to the general problem.) We show that a small subsidy increases welfare in the dynamic model, just as in the static analogue, when the two models have similar characteristics. First, we assume that a change in I, has a greater effect on firm i's payoff than it does on j's, so that I H I > 0. Thi s inequality and the secondorder condition to Firm f's problem implies alh/av > 0, We also assume that an increase in kh decreases the foreign firm's shadow value of (its own) capital, which implies that al,/av < 0.
Two additional piausibie assumptions allow us to determine the welfare effects of a smail subsidy. The first of these i s that an increase in foreign capitai decreases the value of the government's program: aJg/a4 < 0. The second is that the shadow value of kh is no less for the government than for the home firm: a(Jg -~' ,)/ak, 2 0.'' If, for exampie, the government wiii refrain from intervening in the future or if the current period i s the iast period (as in static models), this last relation hoids with equaiity.
l o The government reaiizes that the anticipation by the rivai of an additionai unit of home investment in this period decreases the rival's current investment, The home firm, on the other hand, takes the rival's current investment as given. Therefore the government has an additionai incentive beyond that of the home firm to increase home investment. As a resuit, we wouid expect the shadow vaiue of home investment for the government to be larger than for the firm.
We now determine the welfare effects of a smail subsidy. First. with respect to v, we subtract the home firm's first-order condition (5). which holds for ail values of v.
from the derivative of the government's payoff (4a). Evaiuating this difference at v = 0. we obtain The inequality follows from the assumptions described above. Because the terms on the left side of (9) that correspond to the home firm's first order equation sum to 0, the inequality implies that the government's payoff is increasing in v in the neighborhood of v = 0. We conclude that a small subsidy increases welfare.
The same conclusion holds in the one-period version of this model. The intuition from the static models i s that, for government intervention to be welfare improving, the government must be able to influence the decision of the home firm (al ;/av # 0) and the response of the foreign firm to a change in the home firm's decision (ai;/alh) must be different than the response expected by the home firm. That i s, government intervention i s effective only if it corrects a "mistake" by the home firm about the effect of its actions on its rivals. For example, in a static Nosh-Cournot game, each firm's believes its rival will not respond to a nonequiiibrium decision, but the siope of its rival's best-response function i s nonzero, so there is a roie for government intervention.
For positive E, dl;/dlh # 0. aithough the home firm takes If as given at a point in time. Therefore, for positive E, there i s a roie for the government to use the policy v in the dynamic game. The home firm does not take into account the effect of its current ievei of investment on its rival's ecluiiibrium ievei of investment. Thus, government intervention becomes ineffective as E becomes smali.
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The home firm's response to a change in v, al&/av, is of a larger order of magnitude than E, SO even as E becomes small the government does not lose the ability to influence the home firm. If alh/av and al,/av were of the same orders of magnitude, the government could achieve its objective by increasing the value of v as E decreases. Because they are of different orders of magnitude. increasing v has a nonnegligible effect on lh even for small values of E, whereas it has a negligible effect on If. Therefore, if E i s small, but positive, the government needs to induce a large change in domestic investment (and thus incur a large adjustment cost) in order to cause a small change in foreign investment. Thus. for small E, the strategic use of industrial policy I s unattractive.
An alternative explanation for the decrease in the effectiveness of government policy as E becomes small i s that the government's first-mover advantage diminishes in a multiperiod game. In the current period of the dynamic game, the firms take the current value of v as given, but, by the Markov assumption, they recognize that future values of v will be determined by future values of k. Because they are able to influence the evolution of k. they can influence future values of v. In the one-period game, there is a clear sense in which the government i s a Stackeiberg leader vis-a-vis the firms, but this relation i s ambiguous in a multistage game, At time t, the firms take vt and kt as given and choose ktCE; at time t +~ the government takes ktCE as given and chooses vt+€. Provided that the length of a period i s non-negligible, there i s some strategic value to industrial policies because the government retains the first-mover advantage within a period. However, the government loses this advantage across periods. Thi s i s why, in a dynamic setting, the strategic value of industriai policy i s less than in static models.
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To consider the limiting case as E approaches 0. we make the additional assumption that the endogenous functions Ji(.) are analytic in E, so that we can apply a first-order Tayior approximation to equations (4) According to Proposition 2, in the continuous-time game, if firms expect the government not to intervene in the future, it is optimal for the government not to intervene at this instant." Proposition 2 does not exclude the possibility that there are
Markov equilibria in which the government intervenes in the limit as E approaches 0.
Neither does it imply that the nonintervention Markov equilibrium i s the limit of the sequence of equilibria obtained as E becomes small and the horizon z becomes large in the discrete stage game. Where subsidies are linear and profits and costs are quadratic, however, we show in the appendix that these results hold:
Proposition 3: The sequence of Markov equilibria of the linear-quadratic model converges to the no-intervention equilibrium described in Proposition 2 as the time horizon goes to infinity (T -+ -) and E -t 0 under the assumption that a stationary equilibrium to the continuous time game exists.
C. Output and indusfriai Policies
In Section 11, we observed that the incentive to use output policies does not depend on the period of commitment, In Section 111. B. we demonstrated that if only investment policies are used. they become ineffective as the period of commitment becomes small. If the government can use both output and industrial poiicies, it " Proposition 2 i s reminiscent of the "Coase Conjecture" (Coase 1972) , which states that as a constant-cost durabie goods monopolist's period of commitment shrinks to 0, its abiliiy to exercise market power vanishes in a Markov equilibrium. Thi s anaiogy emphasizes the importance of the Markov assumption. Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) analyze non-Markov equiiibria for the durobie goods model: the intuition they provide i s also applicable to our model, retains an incentive to use both, regardiess of the period of commitment; however, its motive for using the industrial poiicy i s non-strategic.
The output poiicies that the government wiil use in equiiibrium depend on the firms' capital stocks. Consequently. even if the government were to resolve to not use industrial poiicies and to use only output poiicies in the future, the home firm's and the government's shadow values of the home capital stock would be different: aJ;/akh # aJQ/ak, because W(k) i s not identical to nh(k). In this case, Proposition 1 continues to hold but Proposition 2 does not. As a result, even as the period of commitment becomes infinitesimal, the government wiil want to use industrial poiicies. it does so because the output poiicies create a "distortion," which can be partiy offset by means of the industrial policy.
In this case, industrial policy i s not used strategically, as an indirect controi on foreign investment. but is used to adjust home investment,12 Thus, although the strategic benefits of investment poiicies are small when commitment i s difficult, nonstrategic benefits may be significant. It follows from this argument that an another reason for eliminating the use of output poiicies i s that such policies increase the incentive for the use of investment subsidies.
IV. Numerical Examples
The ineffectiveness of industriai poiicies can be illustrated using a iinear-quadratic modei. In this modei, which i s described more fully in the Appendix, demand i s linear, marginal cost i s constant, and output is proportional to capital, so that the l2 Other types of distortion, such as those caused by a difference between private and social cost of an input, would also create an incentive for the use of investment poiicy. profit function i s quadratic in k and the cost of adjustment (%612) i s quadratic in investment. The equiiibrium decision rules are obtained by dynamic programming.
The recursive equations that determine the equiiibrium are too complicated to admit closed form analysis, but they can be solved numerica~l~.'~ Table 1 shows the percentage increase in each agent's payoff resulting from optimal intervention by the government. In this example the difference between the demand intercept and the constant marginal cost equals one, the cost of adjustment is %12 (that i s, 6 = l), and the continuous discount rate, r, i s 0.05. We choose a unit of time to equal 1 year, so if E equals one. the discount factor, p = e-'€. is approximately 0.95. For E = 0.1, the length of the period of commitment i s approximately five weeks.
We use a time horizon, z, of 15 years and the initial condition i s k = (1 13, 1 /3 ), the noncooperative equilibrium in the static Nash game with no cost of adjustment. The first row of Table 1 gives the percentage increases in agents' weifare in the static model, which i s included for purposes of comparison. Government intervention increases domestic welfare (the home firm's profits less the transfer) by 12.5 percent in the static modei. In the dynamic game when the period of commitment, E, i s one year, intervention increases domestic weifare by 6.4 percent, When the period of commitment i s 0.1 year, government intervention increases domestic welfare by less than 1 percent. Government intervention increases the home firm's profits more than it does domestic welfare. because the firm receives a positive subsidy, as in the static game.
The tabie demonstrates iwo important features of the general modei. First, even for a fairly iong period of commitment, the benefits of government intewention l3 Details of the algorithm are avaiiabie from the authors upon request. 20 are overstated by the static model. For example, for E = 1. where the government can commit for a year, benefits are only half those of the static model. Second, as the period of commitment shrinks, the benefits of government intervention become negligible.
If the government could commit to a sequence of future subsidies, it would retain its first-mover advantage and could increase home welfare by more than in the subgame perfect equilibrium above. A weaker form of commitment, studied by Driskell and McCafferty (1989b) , is for the government to announce a constant subsidy per unit of investment for all periods. With this subsidy, the gross transfer from the government to the firm changes over time. as the level of investment changes, and approaches 0 in the steady state. It i s not obvious whether the government would prefer this weaker form of commitment or the Markov rules. The former entails less flexibility because the government has a single choice variable, The optimal fixed subsidy depends on the initial condition: the Markov rules are independent of the initial condition.
The optimal fixed subsidy F (shown in the first row of Table 2 , for the base parameters E = 1 and T = 100) i s relatively insensitive to the initial levels of capital, In the first period. the present discounted value of the government's payoff in the initiai period when it chooses the optimal fixed subsidy (second row) i s greater, for any initiai k, than the government's payoff in the initial period when v i s chosen according to the Markov ruies (last row). Thus, in this linear-quadratic example, the benefits from committing to a fixed F more than compensate for the loss of policy flex~b~iity.
Similarly, for any k, the weifare in the steady state under the fixed subsidy is greater than with the variable industrial poiicy.
For all initial conditions, with a fixed subsidy, the steady-state capitai of the home firm, kh, i s higher and the foreign firm's level, k, i s lower than with the Markov policy. These steady-state levels of capital are fairly close to the Stackelberg equiiibriurn in the corresponding static game, k = (0.5, 0.25). but kh i s always less than 0.5. Although the government does not obtain as favorable a steady state in the dynamic game as in the static equilibrium, it comes closer to doing so with the fixed policy rule than with the Markov rules,
V. Summary and Conclusions
In static and two-period markets, previous models show that governments have strategic incentives to use export or production subsidies or taxes to i n t e~e n e in imperfectly competitive international markets. shifting profits from foreign competitors to the domestic industry. Except for primary materials. however, output poiicies violate either the spirit or the letter of international agreements, and are politicaiiy unattractive. As a result, many policy makers advocate the use of industriai poiicies. Using a dynamic model, we show that, if the government i s unable to make binding commitments about its future use of industrial policy, these poiicies are of limited strategic use. in contrast, the efficacy of output policies i s not diminished by a limited period of commitment. Thi s fundamentai difference between industriai and output poiicies had been obscured in previous static models.
The intuition from the static models remains qualitatively correct in a dynamic model: The circumstances that encourage output subsidies aiso encourage industriai poiicies that impiicitiy subsidize the domestic industry. The static models, however, exaggerate the benefits of industriai poiicies in a muitiperiod market. The strategic benefits from industrial policy are negligibie if the government can only make commit-22 ments for short periods. The use of output policies gives the government a nonstrategic incentive to use investment policies, even if the period of commitment is small.
Our analysis suggests that GATT negotiators have, perhaps inadvertently, been correct in focusing their efforts on attempts to limit the use of output policy, Industrial poiicy i s iikely to be less of a threat to free trade than output policies, and the use of output policies provide an additional motive for using industrial policies.
Our assumption that the government and the firms have the same period of commitment is an unnecessary restriction and, in many markets, unrealistic. Our analysis does not turn on whether the period of commitment i s the same for all players but on whether the government's ability to commit i s limited. One would expect such limitations in industries that are changing rapidly, and for which future conditions are very uncertain. In these cases it i s difficult for the government to commit credibly to future policies, because agents recognize that as circumstances change, the government wiil be tempted to change its policy. In other words, agents recognize that the government's policy i s state contingent. High-tech industries, such as computer chips, fit this description, and it i s preciseiy these industries for which the sentiment in favor of industrial policy has been strongest. Thi s analysis suggests that industries that replace capital at wider intervals, such as traditional manufacturing, would be better candidates for the application of industrial policy. Indeed. most developed countries use industrial policies in textiles and shipbuilding, Both industrial and output policies are even iess likely to be useful strategicaily when foreign governments can intervene, firms of other countries can enter the world market. or a variety of other assumptions maintained above (and in most static models) are dropped, Thus, the strategic use of output and industrial policies should 
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To verify that the non-intervention policy (v -0) i s typically not part of a Markov equilibrium to the discrete stage game (E > 0), we use a proof by contradiction. Let E > 0 and suppose that the firms and the government expect that v will be zero in ail future periods. Then Jg(k++,) -Jt;(k++,) so the term in brackets in (9) where 5 i s the sociai cost of a unit of capitai, if, however, the firm rents capitai, as with human capital, then it i s reasonable to set 5 = 0 and put the rentai cost in the restricted profit function ni. We take this latter approach in the text to reduce the number of parameters.
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The proof of this lemma, which is based on the algorithm used to compute the numerical examples in section IV, i s available from the authors. In the proof, it i s first established that in the last period the value functions are quadratic and the decision rules are iinear; and i s then shown by induction that this result holds at every previous stage. Existence can be established for specific parameter values using numerical methods as discussed in the text. In order for this relation to hold identicaily, the partial derivative of the right side, with respect to k , must be identicaily equal to 0. Taking this derivative and setting the result equal to 0 (after factoring out the non-zero term ( h + glk)-(r+gf)lgf) produces an expression that i s quadratic in k and invoives the parameters a, y, 0, h, and g. In order for this expression to vanish, the coefficients of the terms involving k must vanish,
Proof of
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Under the hypothesis that gf i s not equai to either r or r/2, we can verify that the requirement that the coefficients of orders of k vanish, implies that a, y and 8 are all 0;
hence, V i s 0 for all vaiues of k as was to be shown,
We now need to verify the hypothesis that gf is equal to neither r nor 112. We do this by showing that gf is non-positive. To demonstrate this, we note that gf i s positive if and only if the foreign firm's (quadratic) vaiue function i s convex in kf. Thi s statement can be verified by checking the foreign firm's linear-quadratic dynamic programming equation. We, therefore, need to establish that the foreign firm's value function is not convex in kf. Suppose. to the contrary, that it was convex. Then. it wouid be possibie to make the vaiue of the foreign firm's program arbitrarily iarge by choosing an initial value of kf sufficiently large and choosing kh = 0. However, the vaiue of the foreign firm's program i s certainiy bounded above by nmlr, where nm i s the steady state flow of monopoly profits. Therefore, the value function i s not convex and gf is not positive. 11 Table 1 Benefits Vary with the Period of Commitment (E) (Percentage Increase in Benefits due to Intervention) * The row for E = i s calculated using the static game.
Table 2 Optimal Fixed Subsidies
PVW*(l) = present value of welfare in the first period for the optimal fixed F. PVW(1) = present value of welfare in the first period when the government chooses v each period. P W ( -) = present value of welfare in the steady state for the optimal fixed F = 2.40 (for all initial values). PVW(-) = present value of welfare in the steady-state when the government chooses v each period = 2.33. Nash = (k,,, $) = (.35, .35) The steady-state when the government chooses F i s (k,,, k, ) = (,48, .28). The steady-state when the government chooses v each period = (.44, .30 
